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CLEAR RULES STILL PRODUCE FUZZY RESULTS:
IMPOSSIBILITY IN INDIAN CONTRACT LAW
C. Scott Pryor*
Robert Scott and others have forcefully argued that the justification for
commercial statute-drafting is efficiency.' Because commercial parties can draft
their own contracts, legislatures should draft default rules, he argues, only when it
will save commercial parties time and money.2 This can be called the efficiency
goal.' Greater efficiency is achieved when the costs of the gains produced by
commercial transactions are reduced. Thus, with few exceptions, the rules of
commercial law should be clear, precise, and what most parties would want most

*

Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law; J.D., University of

Wisconsin Law School, 1980; M.A., Reformed Theological Seminary, 1997. My thanks
must go to the J. William Fulbright Scholarship Board for the award of a scholarship to
teach in India, Regent University for the sabbatical leave that enabled me to spend a
semester abroad, and Vice-Chancellor N.N. Mathur and Associate Professor V.S. Shasthri
of the National Law University, Jodhpur for their gracious hospitality and institutional
support for my research while in India. Thanks are also due to Professor Amar Singh for
his encouragement and input on this article and Nilima Bhadbhade, Senior Lecturer at ILS
Law College, for her comments.
1. See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of International
Sales Law, 25 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 446 (2005); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
PoliticalEconomy of PrivateLegislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott,
The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994). But see Shawn J. Bayern, Rational
Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in Contract
Law, 97 CAL. L. REv. 943, 946 (2009) (arguing that the conclusion of Schwartz and Scott
"seriously misstates the costs and benefits of formalism"); Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of
Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism
(June 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419683
(contrasting certainty with predictability and arguing that failure of the former does not
equate to lack of the latter).
2. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Does the CISG Fill a Much-Needed Gap?, 101 AM.
SocY INT'L L. PROc. 414, 414 (2007) ("Codification of contract law, whether through a
domestic statute or an international convention, should be seen as an effort to reduce the
costs of contracting by providing parties terms that operate by default.").
3. This should be so regardless of whether efficiency is understood in terms of
performance or reliance. See generally Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of
Enforcing Promises, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 19 (Peter Benson
ed., 2001).
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of the time.4 This is the precision corollary to the efficiency goal. Statutory
precision emulates a well-drafted agreement and reduces the risk of moral hazard.'
The excuse of contractual impossibility may be in tension with the goal
of efficiency. This conflict becomes more pronounced as impossibility is relaxed
to include impracticability and frustration of purpose. On the one hand, parties'
evaluation of the welfare-enhancing nature of contractual obligations should not
be undercut by subsequent regret. On the other hand, contract parties obviously
believe that the occurrences of some post-contract states of affairs warrant
discharge of unperformed contractual obligations; after all, they regularly
incorporate force majeure clauses into their contracts. Moreover, it seems
plausible that the same parties would prefer not to expend the resources necessary
to describe these risks in a contract and instead would wish to leave this issue to
standard form legislation.6 Or at least they would if the American versions of
impracticability were not pitched at such a high level of abstraction that they
transgress the precision corollary.' Finally, the fact that people are generally risk
averse suggests that the possibility of a judicial "out" would encourage the
practice of contracting generally; the systemic cost of the excuse of
impracticability is a form of insurance.' In other words, for most people, the value
of avoiding a possible catastrophic loss exceeds the cost of eliminating a potential
windfall gain.'
Two responses to the uncertainty created by American versions of
impracticability seem plausible. First, the law could provide a more precise
impracticability rule-one that complies with the precision corollary.
Alternatively, the impracticability project can be abandoned, letting risks fall

4. Stephan, supra note 2, at 414 ("If the terms in the CISG were to conform to party
desires, that law would reduce the costs of contracting, both saving parties some expense
and making contracting more attractive.").
5. Gillette & Scott, supra note 1, at 458 ("Standards, however, risk undermining the
predictability that commercial parties prefer and can create problems of moral hazard.").
6.

See STEPHEN A.

SMITH,

CONTRACT THEORY 293 (2004) ("[I]f potential

contracting parties know that courts will allocate low probability risks in the same way that
they would have done themselves, they can confidently enter contracts without specifying
how those risks should actually be allocated.").
7. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266
(1981); see also Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369

(2004).
8.

See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY

AND PROFIT 233-63

(1921)

(analyzing distinction between risk and uncertainty and relationship of insurance to the
former); see also NAssIM TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY

IMPROBABLE (2007) (popularizing the distinction between "known unknowns" and

"unknown unknowns" and their impact on decision-making).
9. See generally Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of
Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.

227 (2004).
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where they may and leaving any excuses to the drafting efforts of the contracting
parties.'"
This article will address the feasibility of the first possible response, that
a better impracticability mousetrap can be built. Instead of speculating about what
forms a more precise version of impracticability might take, this article will
examine a currently subsisting example, Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872. Part I of this article will examine the text of Section 56, its history and
meaning, and its leading Indian judicial applications. Part II will summarize the
American experience with impracticability, while Part III will briefly address the
long-standing challenges impracticability and its cognates have presented in the
history of Western legal thought. Part IV will take account of a competing
normative perspective justifying impracticability and conclude with the author's
view of the virtue of applying Section 56 as originally understood.

I. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
A. The Scope of the Field
Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act" is straightforward. Its three
sections lay out two rules regarding impossibility and what amounts to a limitation
on the first rule. The first directive is brief and to the point:
56. Agreement to do impossible act. - An agreement to do an
act impossible in itself is void.' 2
The third section is consistent with the well-recognized common law
limitation on the excuse recognized in the first section:
Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known
to be impossible or unlawful. - Where one person has promised
to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence,
might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be
impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation
to such promisee for any loss which such promisee sustains
through the non-performance of the promise.

10. See Scott, supra note 7, at 370 (arguing that public contract law is dying because
of a move "from bright line rules to vague standards").
11. Indian Contract Act

§ 56, No. 9 of 1872; INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL (5th ed. 1989), v.

14, availableat http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=187209.
12. Indian Contract Act
13. Id.

§ 56.

4
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These paragraphs restate contract rules going back to Roman lawl 4 and
represent the law of England in 1872.15 No reported cases in India, and relatively
few in America, have fallen within their scope. 6 However, the Indian limitation
of relief to the aggrieved party for "losses sustained" (thus excluding recovery for
gains prevented) when the obligor knew or should have known what had been
promised was impossible contrasts with the Restatement's view that would permit
recovery of both losses sustained and gains prevented."
The second paragraph of Section 56 addresses the core of
impracticability:
Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or
unlawful. - A contract to do an act which, after the contract is
made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which
the Promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when
the act becomes impossible or unlawful."
Subsequent illegality provokes a host of practical issues, but it is
impossibility (or impracticability) that has drawn substantial analytic attention
over the years." The term "impossible" in Section 56 raises several concerns.
How would a law-minded audience in 1872 have understood "impossible"? And,
assuming we can answer that question with reasonable clarity, how do Indian
courts apply Section 56 today?
B. History and Context of Section 56
The process of drafting the Indian Contract Act began in 1861 in England
with the creation of the third Indian Law Commission.20 Upon receiving the
14. DIG. 50.17.185 (Celsus, Digestum 8) ("Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.").
15. See infra text accompanying notes 26-43; see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
DINSHA FARDUNJI MULLA, INDIAN CONTRACT & SPECIFIC RELIEF ACTS 1123 (R.G. Padia &
Nilima Bhadbhade eds., Lexis 2006) (1905) ("The first paragraph represents the same law
as in England."). Indeed, the same is true in America. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 266 (1981).
16. As of October 2009, no Indian cases under this paragraph of Section 56 have
been reported. For general discussions of American law on existing impossibility, see E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 658-60 (3d ed. 1999); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 515 (4th ed. 1998). See also U.C.C. § 2-613 cmt. 2
(2004).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 272(2), 377.

18. Indian Contract Act § 56.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 67-117.
20. See Atul Chandra Patra, HistoricalBackgroundof the Indian ContractAct, 1872,
4 J. INDIAN L. INST. 373, 393 (1962) ("The Indian Contract Bill was drafted originally by
the (Third) Indian Law Commission constituted in December, [sic] 1861, and functioning
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Commission's proposed bill in 1867, the bill was referred to a select committee of
the Council of the Governor-General in India21 where Fitzjames Stephen took the
lead in making limited revisions, none of which pertained to Section 56.22 The
drafters' goal had been to create a simplified version of English common law with
modifications necessary for the Indian context. 2 3 Both the Governor-General and
the Lieutenant-Governor of India expressed concern that parts of the bill were too
hard-edged for many persons in India. However, the Council demurred, and the
bill became the Indian Contract Act, effective September 1, 1872.24 Interestingly,
the responses of several Council members to the meliorating suggestions of the
Governor-General and Lieutenant-Governor anticipated the efficiency arguments
described above:
In reference to His Honour's general complaint that the Bill was
a hard one the Hon'ble Mr. Bullen Smith said that a Contract
Law must, from its very nature, be cast in a somewhat hard
mould, and that any attempt to eliminate this element of
hardness from it, would certainly tend to mar its usefulness and
render it a weak, ineffective measure.25
What was the state of English law on the subject of impossibility during
the drafting of the Indian Contract Act? The leading treatise on English contract
law in 1861 would probably have been Joseph Chitty's Law of Contracts.2 6
Chitty's work exemplifies the "hard mould" later advocated by the Council in its
deliberations. Thus, according to Chitty, where a contract may have become
extremely difficult to perform, it continues to bind a promisor "notwithstanding it
is beyond the power of the party to perform it-it being deemed to be his own
fault and folly, that he did not thereby expressly provide against

in England."); see also M.P. JAIN, OUTLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY 466-68 (1952)
(discussing history of Third Indian Law Commission and its tense relationship with the
Government of India).
21. See 1 WHITLEY STOKES, ANGLO-INDIAN CODES 534 (1887).
22. See Patra,supra note 20, at 394-95; see also JAIN, supra note 20, at 648.
23. 1 POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 15, at 7. See also Patra, supra note 20, at 395
("The scope of the Bill was to bring the Indian Law of Contract, as far as might be, into
harmony with the English law on the same subject, as established by recognized practice,
by Statute, and by the latest and best judicial decisions of the time.").
24. Indian Contract Act § 1, No. 9 of 1872; INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL (5th ed. 1989), v.
14 ("[1]t shall come into force on the first day of September, 1872.").
25. Patra, supra note 20, at 397. Another councilor "thought that the policy of the
law should be certain and unequivocal and the provisions for its enforcement impartially
stringent." Id. The goal of efficiency and its precision corollary were in the forefront of
the legislators' minds.
26. JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (6th ed. London, Sweet
1857).

6

Arizona Journalof International& ComparativeLaw, Vol. 27, No. I

2010

contingencies . . . ."27 According to Chitty, even contractual terms purporting to
reduce a party's absolute liability were of limited value because courts would
construe them very narrowly.2 s
Bookending Chitty's work, which pre-dated the early drafting of the
29
Indian Contract Act, was Frederick Pollock's 1876 Principles of Contract.
Pollock's work is particularly salient because he and Fitzjames Stephen were
close associates," and because, as this article will show, Pollock was an early
commentator on the Indian Contract Act.' While there is little evidence of the
"hard mould" of contract law softening in Pollock's treatise, it represents a
substantial development in the substantive analysis of relief for impossibility from
Chitty's earlier exposition. Pollock's statement of the basic rule of the effect of
subsequent events is blunt:
An agreement is not void merely by reason of the performance
being impossible in fact, nor does it become void by the
performance becoming impossible in fact without the default of
either party, unless according to the true intention of the parties
the agreement was conditional on the performance of it being or
continuing possible in fact.32
Pollock's analysis of the parties' "true intention" extended over many
pages and fell into two standard categories of excuse: where performance of the
contract depends on a continuing existence of some object and where it depends
on the life or health of a particular person.33 Pollock observed that other examples
of impossibility could be found in English cases, but, in each, he believed such a
27. Id. at 640 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 641.

And where the lessee in a coal lease, covenanted to pay a certain
proportion of the value of the coals to be raised, unless prevented by
unavoidable accident from working the pit: it was held, that if the

accident were of such a nature, that to work the pit was not physically
impossible, but such working might have been effected, although at an
expense greater than the value of the coals to be raised, the defendant
was liable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
29. FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (London,
Stevens & Sons 1876).
30. See NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION
15 (2004) (describing Pollock and Stephen's membership in the Conversazione Society
beginning in 1865).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 41-53.
32. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 323.
33. Id. at 336-45.
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result was justified by the contract's construction, one that discovered an implied
34
In any event, Pollock did not
condition under the particular facts of that case.
believe that excessive difficulty or unreasonable cost warranted an excuse for a
contractual obligation.3"
Two other parts of the Indian Contract Act are also important. Sections
32 through 36 address the topic of "contingent contracts." A contingent contract
is a "contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such
contract, does or does not happen,"3 6 what would be understood in American
Section 32 specifically provides that a contract
contract law as a condition.
38
Section 9
becomes void if the occurrence of a contingency becomes impossible.
39
Indian courts, thus, have statutory
authorizes recognition of implied terms.
warrant to imply conditions which, when unsatisfied, authorize discharge of
40
unperformed obligations.
Did the separation of Sections 9 and 32 in the Indian Contract Act (the
law for implied conditions) from Section 56 impossibility signify a change in the
substantive understanding of excuse for changed circumstances? Pollock is not
entirely clear in Principles of Contract. He observed, generally, that the Indian
Contract Act simplified English law on the subject, but "perhaps," he opined, "at
34. Id. at 335 (describing the "modem tendency" as seeking "to reduce all the rules
on this subject to rules of construction."). Pollock appears eventually to have retreated
from the principle that excuse for impossibility could be justified by the doctrine of implied
conditions. See DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 199.
35. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 326 ("If a man may bind himself to do something
which is only not known to be impossible, much more can he bind himself to do something
which is known to be possible, however expensive and troublesome."); id. at 330
("(I]mpossibility of this kind [by reason of particular circumstances] is no excuse for the
failure to perform an unconditional contract, whether it exists at the date of the contract, or
arises from events which happen afterwards."); id. ("Still less will unexpected difficulty or
inconvenience short of impossibility serve as an excuse.").
36. Indian Contract Act § 31, No. 9 of 1872; INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL (5th ed. 1989), v.
14.

37. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).
38. Indian Contract Act § 32 ("Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an
uncertain future event happens cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has
happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.").
39. Id. § 9 ("In so far as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words,
the promise is said to be express. Insofar as such proposal or acceptance is made otherwise
than in words, the promise is said to be implied."). For the deployment of Section 9 outside
the context of offer and acceptance, see generally 1 POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 15, at
252-53.
40. See 1 POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 15, at 1138 ("According to [§] 9 of the
Contract Act, the terms of contract may be expressed or implied. Therefore, where as a
matter of construction, the contract itself contains, impliedly or expressly, a term according
to which it would stand discharged on the happening of a certain event, the dissolution of
the contract would take place under the terms of the contract itself and that would be
outside the scope of [§] 56.").

8
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the expense of definiteness on some points."4 1 His only specific conclusion,
however, was limited to the observation that the Indian Contract Act made
continued possibility an implied condition in all contracts. 4 2 It can be inferred that
Pollock thought that "impossible" in Section 56 still meant impossible as
understood in the English common law by his observation that Illustration e to
Section 56 was drawn from Robinson v. Davison. Pollock had earlier classified
Robinson as an example of the second standard category of implied conditionsone depending on the continued life or health of a person.43
Pollock's opinion of the Indian Contract Act did not improve with the
passage of time. In 1905, the first edition of his treatise co-authored with Dinshah
Mulla was published." Pollock wrote in the preface that "not only [is the Indian
Contract Act] the work of different hands, but work done from quite different
45
Pollock
points of view, has been pieced together with an incongruous effect."
with a
a
problem
to
resolve
it
attempted
56
because
Section
especially disliked
positive rule of law-a problem that he believed had been handled well by
English and American courts as a matter of construction.4 6 He was especially

41. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 353.
42. Id. (citing Indian Contract Act §§ 53 (failure of constructive condition of
performance), 56, and 67 (implied duty of cooperation)). Pollock also queried whether
Section 65 (allowing restitution to the discharged party for benefits conferred on other
party) represented a change from English common law. Id. at 354. While Pollock's
point-that continued possibility is an implied term of all contracts subject to the Indian
Contract Act-is clear, he does not explain the Act's continued separation of preexisting
impossibility from subsequent impossibility.
43. Id. at 341. See also supra text accompanying note 33.
44. FREDERICK POLLOCK & DINSHAH FARDJUNI MULLA, THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
(1905).
45. Id. at iv-v. Immediately thereafter Pollock excoriates the use of the Field Code
by certain of the drafters in India.
Another source of unequal workmanship, and sometimes of positive
error, is that the framers of the Indian Codes, and of the Contract Act in
particular, were tempted to borrow a section here and a section there
from the draft Civil Code of New York, an infliction which the sounder
lawyers of that State have been happily successful so far in averting
from its citizens. This code is in our opinion . .. about the worst piece
of codification ever produced.
Id. at v. However, Pollock's antipathy to legislation generally might have been as
significant a reason for his shrill comments as were his concerns about particular aspects of
the Indian Contract Act. See DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 169-74 (describing Pollock's
hostility toward legislation generally in terms of its frustration of common sense, stifling of
principles, and failure to take account of costs of new statutory duties).
46. POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 44, at 210 ("[Section 56] varies the Common
Law to a large extent, and moreover the Act lays down positive rules of law on questions
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concerned that the second paragraph of Section 56 might be understood to reverse
the presumption of common law that an unconditional promise bound the
promisor in all circumstances." Without a condition, a promise was virtually
absolute; although, Pollock was quick to point out that conditions could be
express or "implied from the nature of the transaction."4 8 Pollock also expanded
his restatement of the common law's standard set of categories of excuses from
the two he had described in 1876 to three in 1905 because of the decision in Krell
v. Henry.4 9 It is not clear why Pollock added this dictum since, as he had earlier
noted in his analysis of Section 56, "English authorities . . . can be of very little

use as guides to the application of this section."50 As its subsequent judgments
reveal, the Indian Supreme Court has followed Pollock's example rather than his
precept.s' Nettled as he may have been by the text of Section 56, Pollock
concluded it had caused no "inconvenience" 52 and observed that Indian courts
could handle the recent doctrine of frustration by implying a condition under
Section 32.s

which English and American Courts have more and more tended, during the last quarter of
a century or longer, to regard as matters of construction .... ).
47. Id. ("The second paragraph has the effect of turning limited exceptions into a
general rule. By the Common Law a man who promises without qualification is bound by
the terms of his promise if he is bound at all. If the parties do not mean their agreement to
be unconditional, it is for them to qualify it by such conditions as they think fit.").

48. Id. at 210-11.
49. Id. at 211.
[A] promise is discharged if, without the promisor's fault, (1)
performance is rendered impossible by law; (2) a specific subjectmatter assumed by the parties to exist or continue in existence is
accidentally destroyed or fails to be produced, or an event or state of
things assumed as the foundation of the contract does not happen or
fails to exist, although performance of the contract according to its
terms may be literally possible; (3) the promise was to perform
something in person, and the promisor dies or is disabled by sickness or
misadventure.
Id (citations omitted).
50. Id.at210.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 67-117.
52. POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 44, at 211 ("There is no reason to believe that a

broad simplification of the English rules was not intended, nor does it appear that any
inconvenience has ensued or is to be expected.").
53. See id. at 212. Here Pollock was utilizing Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng.
Rep. 309 (Q.B.), to its fullest. It seems clear that Pollock grounded his organizing principle
for English cases excusing performance based on an implied condition of continuing
possibility on Taylor, which postdated Chitty's treatise but preceded the Indian Contract
Act. See POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 336, 341, 344, 351, 353. See also infra text
accompanying notes 144-145.

10
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Reviewing the text and history of Section 56, as well as selected English
treatise writers, suggests that the best way of understanding the second paragraph
of Section 56 is that it incorporated the two long-standing presumptive excusescontinuing existence of a particular object and continuing life or health of a
particular person.54 Sections 9 and 32, in turn, were designed to afford relief
based on implications that could be drawn from the relationship of the parties,
their prior dealings, and the purpose of the contract at issue." Given the 1871
enactment of the Indian Contract Act, it is extraordinarily unlikely that excuse on
account of later developments like subjective impracticability or frustration were
within the intendment or original understanding of Section 56.

C. Application of Section 56
During the years before India's independence, the Privy Council
rendered a few judgments on cases connected with Section 56. Pradgas
Mathuradasv. JeewanlaP is instructive. An Indian seller and buyer entered into
a contract for the sale of "Penang quality" tin5 7 on December 8, 1941,
notwithstanding the widespread awareness that World War II had just reached the
Far East.5 ' The price rose throughout the day and, by December 22nd, the seller
asserted that it would not be able to acquire the tin due to "unforeseen trouble in
Penang." 59 The buyer sued for damages in February of the next year, but the trial
court dismissed the case on the ground of impossibility.60 The High Court of
West Bengal reversed, holding that there was neither a basis to imply a
contingency excusing performance nor was it impossible for the seller to have
performed." The Privy Council affirmed.62 With respect to the implication of a
contingency, presumably under Section 32, it concluded that

54. See supra text accompanying note 32.
55. See 1 POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 15, at 254 ("The terms implied [under
Section 9 of the Indian Contract Act] may be of three types: (i) terms implied by custom;
(ii) terms implied by law; and (iii) other terms implied by courts.").
56. Pragdas Mathuradas v. Jeewanlal, Ltd., A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 217.
57. See PAUL W. THRUSH, DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL, AND RELATED TERMS
803 (1st ed. 1968) (defining Penang tin as "tin of about 99.95 percent purity, obtained from
the Penang mines" in modem day Malaysia.).
58. PragdasMathuradas,A.I.R. 1948 P.C. at 218.

59. Id. at 218-19.
60. Id. ("The contract became impossible of performance owing to the non-arrival of
tin from Penang." (citation omitted)).
61. Id. (relying upon Chief Justice Sir Harold Derbyshire's opinion that the
fulfillment of this contract was not contingent upon the arrival of the Penang Tin, and "the
contract was broken by the defendants").
62. Id. at 220 ("[I]n their Lordships' view the learned Chief Justice and his
colleagues arrived at the right conclusion .... ).
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The Court . . . ought not to imply a term merely because it
would be a reasonable term to include if the parties had thought
about the matter, or because one party, if he had thought about
the matter, would not have made the contract unless the term
was included; it must be such a necessary term that both parties
must have intended that it should be a term of the contract, and
have only not expressed it because its necessity was so obvious
that it was taken for granted.
The seller's defense of impossibility under Section 56 fared no better
because, while Penang had been occupied by the Japanese since December 16th,
tin of equal quality was available in Calcutta-albeit at a cost of 40% more than
the contract sale price.(A The Privy Council did not consider Section 56
expansively; there was no suggestion that the meaning of "impossible" was
broader than what had been understood in 1872.
Since India's independence in 1947, the Indian Supreme Court has
addressed Section 56 a number of times. However, those judgments have
expressed fundamentally contradictory understandings of the foundation and
purpose of Section 56.66 In the first post-independence case, a three-judge panel
67
issued a judgment in 1954 in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co.,
68
reversing a judgment by the Calcutta High Court. The facts of Satyabrata Ghose
were straightforward. In August 1940, the plaintiff-purchaser and defendantdeveloper executed a contract for the sale of a plot of land in the then undeveloped
Lake Colony in Calcutta. 9 The purchaser deposited 101 rupees (Rs.) as earnest
money and agreed to pay the balance of approximately Rs. 4,900 "within one
month from the date of completion of the roads."" Nothing in the contract
specified any time within which the roads were to be completed."

63. Id. (quoting Comptoir Commercial Anverpois v. Power Son & Co., (1920) 1 K.B.
868, 899-900).
64. Id. at 218, 220.
65. See id at 220. Prior to Pragdas Mathuradas, the Privy Council considered
Section 56 in Govindram Sesaria v. Radbone, and held that the declaration of war between

the United Kingdom and Germany rendered void a contract between a German and an
Indian firm. A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 46.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 67-117.
67. Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 44.
68. Id. at 50.
69. Id. at 45.
70. Id. The agreement further provided that time was of the essence. Id.
Presumably this applied to the parties' duties to pay and convey because there were no
references to time for other obligations.
71. Id. at 49 ("[T]here [was] absolutely no time limit within which the roads and
drains [were] to be made.").
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In November of the following year, before construction of the roads had
begun, the government issued a series of orders requisitioning the lots of Lake
Colony for the war effort. Two more years passed and, in November of 1943,
the developer presented the buyer with an ultimatum: agree either to cancel the
contract and get back his earnest money or to pay the balance due, receive a deed,
and accept the developer's promise to complete the roads after the war.73
Accepting neither of its proffered alternatives, threatened the developer, would be
deemed a cancelation of the contract with a forfeiture of the earnest money.74 The
buyer rejected both alternatives and replied that it was standing on the contract.7 5
In January 1946, the buyer brought an action seeking a declaration that the
contract had not been discharged and that it was entitled to a deed.76 The
developer pled the defense of impossibility, which failed at the trial court but
succeeded before the High Court.
The lengthy reasoning of the Indian Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose
nearly succeeds in obscuring its uncomplicated (if somewhat prolix) conclusion:
In our opinion, having regard to the nature and terms of the
contracts, the actual existence of war conditions at the time
when it was entered into, the extent of the work involved in the
development scheme and last though not the least the total
absence of any definite period of time agreed to by the parties
within which the work was to be completed, it cannot be said
the requisition order vitally affected the contract or made its
performance impossible.7
What could have been a very short judgment, one in which the Supreme
Court concluded that a promisor could not avoid its duty to perform when it was
the promisee whose interests were injured by the delay, became a far-ranging
discussion of the meaning of "impossible" in Section 56.9 Alternatively, the
Court could have taken the word "impossible" in its classical sense and simply
72. Id.
73. Id. at 45-46.
74. Id. at 46.

75. Id. ("[T]he plaintiff refused to accept either of the two alternatives ... and stated
categorically that the latter was bound by the terms of the agreement .... ).
76. Id. ("On 18th of January 1946 the suit . . . was commenced by the plaintiff
against the defendant . . . for a two-fold declaration, namely, (1) that the contract ... was

still subsisting; and (2) that the plaintiff was entitled to get a conveyance executed and
registered by the defendant on payment of the consideration . . . .").
77. Id. ("The only question canvassed before the High Court was whether the
contract of sale was frustrated by reason of the requisition orders issued by the
Government. The learned Judges answered this question in the affirmative . . . [and]

dismissed the plaintiff's suit.").
78. Id. at 50.
79. See id. at 47-48.
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concluded that a delay (particularly a delay that worked to the detriment of the
promisee, not the promisor seeking to avoid its obligations) did not make
performance of a contract impossible. However, the Court did not take the simple
path. Instead, it expanded the meaning of impossible to include frustration and
impracticability and analyzed post-1872 English cases and explanations of
excuses based on implied terms-only to abandon them.80 The Court reasoned that
Section 56 was a mandatory rule of positive law-yet remarked that parties could
contract around it. 8
Moreover, the
Section 56 employs the single word "impossible."
statutory illustrations suggest that the Council did not contemplate extending the
application of impossible beyond its meaning in the common law in 1872.82 In
Satyabrata Ghose, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that
This much is clear, that the word "impossible" has not been
used here in the sense of physical or literal impossibility. The
performance of an act may not be literally impossible but it may
be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object
and purpose which the parties had in view; and if an untoward
event or change of circumstances totally upsets the very

80. Id. at 48 ("In deciding cases in India, the only doctrine that we have to go by is
that of supervening impossibility or illegality as laid down in Section 56 . . .
81. The Court further explained:

[I]f the parties do contemplate the possibility of an intervening
circumstance which might affect the performance of the contract, but
expressly stipulate that the contract would stand despite such
circumstances, there can be no case of frustration because the basis of
the contract being to demand performance despite the happening of a
particular event, it cannot disappear when that event happens.
Id. at 48.
82. Only two of the five illustrations pertain to the applicable second part of Section
56:
(b) A and B contract to marry each other. Before the time fixed for the
marriage, A goes mad. The contract becomes void. . . . (e) A contracts
to act at a theatre for six months in consideration of a sum, paid in
advance by B. On several occasions A is too ill to act. The contract to
act on those occasions becomes void.
Indian Contract Act § 56, No. 9 of 1872; INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL (5th ed. 1989), v. 14.
Presumably, (a) illustrates the requirement of mental competence to marry. See also
POLLOCK & MULLA, supra note 44, at 211 ("The illustrations do not, indeed, appear to go
beyond English authority. . . ."). Illustration (e) is drawn from Robinson v. Davison,
(1987) 6 L.R. Exch. 269. See supra note 42
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foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, it can
very well be said that the promisor finds it impossible to do the
act he promised to do."
The Court left unsaid why it believed it was clear that "impossible" did
not mean what English courts would have recognized in 1872.4
In the course of its judgment the Court appears as though it was looking
for an implied condition, which it never found. 5 Yet, the Court did not base its
judgment on Section 32.86 It made it clear that any application of Section 56 was
a matter of law, not fact, and a matter of judicial imposition, not one of discovery
of the parties' tacit intentions. The Court observed that English judges had
developed the doctrine of impossibility and expanded it to encompass
impracticability and frustration through a combination of implying conditions"
88
and aggressively constructing contractual terms. However, Sections 9 and 32 of
the Indian Contract Act address construction of implied conditions, thus leaving
Section 56 to the courts as a matter of law:
In deciding cases in India, the only doctrine that we have to go
by is that of supervening impossibility or illegality as laid down
in Section 56 . . . . It must be borne in mind, however, that

Section 56 lays down a rule of positive law and does not leave
the matter to be determined according to the intention of the
parties.8

83. Satyabrata Ghose, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. at 46. Later, the Satyabrata Ghose court
reiterates this conclusion when it observes that "[i]t would be incorrect to say that Section
56 of the Contract Act applies only to case of physical impossibility . . . " Id. at 47.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
85. CompareSatyabrata Ghose, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. at 47-48 (discussing English cases
grounding impossibility on doctrine of implied conditions) with id. at 48 ("To my mind the
theory of the implied condition is not really consistent with the true theory of frustration."
(quoting Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co., [1944] A.C. 265, 275
(H.L.)).
86. Id. at 48 (explaining that "there is no question of finding out an implied term
agreed to by parties ... because the parties did not think about the matter . . . .").
87. Id. at 47 ("It seems necessary however to clear up some misconception which is
likely to arise because of the complexities of the English law on the subject. The law of
frustration in England developed, as is well known, under the guise of reading implied
terms into contracts."). Indian contract law uses the term "contingency" as the equivalent
of the American "condition." Compare Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of 1872 § 32; INDIA
A.I.R. MANUAL (5th ed. 1989), v. 14 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224
(1981).
88. Satyabrata Ghose, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. at 48 ("In any view, it is a question of
'construction."').
89. Id.
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So, what is the rule if not impossibility as traditionally understood? How
does the Court articulate the judicial task of absolution9 0 without a precise rule?
In its own words, "[w]hen such an event or change of circumstance occurs which
is so fundamental as to be regarded by law as striking at the root of the contract as
a whole, it is the court which can pronounce the contract to be frustrated and at an
end." 9' How is a court to apply such an imprecise standard? If the Court's
discussion in Satyabrata Ghose is an example, an Indian court will apply Section
56 by looking at the same facts and drawing the same sorts of inferences as any
court construing a contract and implying conditions would examine.9 2 What is the
end or purpose of this judicial absolution? Why should the law release a party
from an obligation?
Because the purpose of judicial absolution is neither
efficiency nor autonomy but, rather, justice, it is to that principle courts must
turn.93
Six years later, in 1960, the Indian Supreme Court (without citing
Satyabrata Ghose) reversed its course and held in Alopi Parshadv. Union ofIndia
that courts do not apply Section 56 because it is "just and reasonable" to excuse
the promisor, but "because on its true construction it does not apply in that
situation."9 Returning to the view that animated Sections 32 and 56 at the outset,
"justice" was understood to be implementing what the Court found to be the
common intention of the parties." Then, in 1968, eight years after Alopi Parshad,

90. Id. at 47 ("The changed circumstances . . . make the performance of the contract
impossible and the parties are absolved from the further performance of it as they did not
promise to perform an impossibility.").
91. Id. at 48.
92. See id. at 49-50 (drawing inference from absence of time provision for road
construction in contract, current combat activities in World War II that had led to other
requisition orders and shortages of construction materials, and temporary nature of
requisition orders in issue, that delay did not "affect the fundamental basis upon which the
agreement rested or struck at the root of the adventure.").
93. Id. at 47 (citing Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue S.S. Co., [1926] A.C. 497, 510
(P.C.)). It is not clear that the Privy Council's early adoption of a "realist" perspective on
impracticability was an accurate summary of English law. Id. ("Frustration ... is really a
device, by which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconciled with a special exception
which justice demands."). A decade earlier, the House of Lords had strongly reaffirmed the
principle of construction of "implied conditions" as the foundation for this excuse. See
F.A. Tamplin S.S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Prods. Co., [1916] A.C. 397 (H.L.).
Even fifteen years later, a majority of the Law Lords expressed support for the classical
justification for impracticability. See Joseph Constantine S.S. Line, Ltd. v. Imperial
Smelting Corp., [1942] A.C. 154 (H.L. 1941).
94. Alopi Parshad & Sons, Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 588, 594; see
also Mugneeram Bangur & Co. v. Gurbachan Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1523 (arising from
same facts as Satyabrata Ghose and following that judgment without reference to
"justice").
95. See Alopi Parshad,A.I.R. 1960 S.C. at 594.
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the Supreme Court in Dhruv Dev v. Harmohinder Singh9 6 again affirmed a
position consistent with an originalist understanding of Section 56:
[W]hen performance is rendered by intervention of law invalid,
or the subject matter assumed by the parties to continue to exist
is destroyed, or a state of things assumed to be the foundation of
the contract fails, or does not happen, or where the performance
is to be rendered personally and the person dies or is disabled,
the contract stands discharged. 97
However, in the same year as Dhruv Dev, the Indian Supreme Court
again heard an appeal from the Calcutta High Court, this time in the form of the
High Court's refusal to set aside an arbitral award in Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v.
98
Khyaliram Jagannath.
Naihati Jute dealt with the sale of goods. Unlike
Satyabrata Ghose, in this case the seller, not the buyer, asserted the defense of
impossibility, and the agreement contained a force majeure clause." The buyer
had agreed to purchase Pakistani jute from the seller, which required the seller to
get an import license from the Indian government's Jute Commission.'" The
parties agreed that the purchase price would increase for every month between
November 1958 and January 1959 that the buyer could not get the license.'o The
contract excused the buyer's obligations if it did not get the import license due to
a variety of factors.102 The Jute Commission repeatedly denied the buyer's request
96. Dhruv Dev v. Harmohinder Singh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1024.
97. Id. at 1025. Without a trace of irony the Court asserts that
No useful purpose will be served by referring to the judgments of the
Supreme Court of the United States of America and the Court of
Session in Scotland . ... Section 56 of the Contract Act lays down a
positive rule relating to frustration of contracts and the Courts cannot
travel outside the terms of that section.
Id. at 1026. The Court went so far as to conclude that Section 56 was exhaustive with
respect to frustration of contracts and that courts "cannot travel outside the terms of that
section." Id.
98. Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram Jagannath, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 522.
99. Id. at 524 (quoting lengthyforce majeure clause).
100. Id. ("[T]he import of Pakistan jute required an import license . . .
101. Id.
102.
Buyers shall not however be held responsible for delay in delivering
letters if authority or opening letters of credit where such delay is
directly or indirectly caused by or due to act of God, war, mobilisation,
de-mobilisation, breaking off trade relations between Governments,
requisition by or interference from Government or force majeure.
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for an import license, and the seller ultimately asserted a claim for damages.
The buyer defended itself on the ground of impossibility, and the matter went to
arbitration before the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, which held against the
buyer.'" The trial court upheld the award, and the High Court affirmed.os
The Supreme Court again reviewed the evolution of English legal theory
and, again, rejected its relevance because "Section 56 laid down a rule of positive
law and did not leave the matter to be determined according to the intention of the
parties."'" NaihatiJute followed Satyabrata Ghose when it came to specifying
this rule of positive law: "[w]hen such an event or change of circumstances which
is so fundamental as to be regarded by law a striking at the root of the contract as
a whole occurs it is the court which can pronounce the contract to be frustrated
and at an end."1o' As in Satyabrata Ghose, the Court canvassed the facts to
implicate the intention of the parties and held that "[w]hat is important in cases
such as the one before us is to ascertain what the parties themselves contemplated
at the time of entering the contract."' 00 However, unlike the Court in Satyabrata
Ghose, the Court went on to conclude that the buyer had taken upon itself an
absolute obligation to get the required license for which there could be no
excuse-either by creative implication or judicial absolution.109

Id.

103. Id. ("On December 11, 1958 the Jute Commissioner refused to issue the license
and . .. [t]he respondents [seller] thereafter by their attorney's letter claimed damages from

the appellants [buyer] .....
104. Id.
105. Id. at 525.
106. Id. at 526-27 (citing Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., A.I.R. 1954
S.C. 44).
107. Id. at 527.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 528.
In our view, the provision in the contract that whereas the delay to
provide a license in November 1958 was to be excused but that the
contract was to be settled at the market rate prevailing on January 2,
1959 if the appellants failed to deliver the license . . . clearly meant that
the appellants had taken upon themselves absolutely the burden of
furnishing the license . .. and had stipulated that in default they would
pay damages ....
Id. Even though Section 56 is not cast as a default rule, in other words, it does not begin
with a phrase like "unless otherwise provided," the Supreme Court treats it as such. Were
Section 56 treated as a mandatory rule, the parties would not be able to engage in
renegotiating the deal. See generally Marta Cenini et al., The Comparative Law and
Economics of Frustration in Contracts 19 (Minn. Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 09-20,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1418035 (discussing losses that would ensue if
were parties unable to deviate from rules of impracticability).
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In 1969, the Supreme Court followed Naihati Jute in Boothalinga
Agencies v. VT.C. PoriaswamiNadar"o in which the Court again reversed course
when it observed that Section 56 had nothing to do with implying conditions from
what the parties "might or would" have agreed had they considered the
contingency."' Instead, impossibility serves as a "device by which the rules as to
absolute contracts are reconciled with the special exceptions which justice
demands."ll 2 Unfortunately, the Court left its understanding of justice undefined.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in 2002 again opened the door to understanding
impossibility in terms of implied conditions in Industrial Finance Corp. v.
Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills, Ltd.," 3 although the Court made no use of
4
Other
this or any other theory of impracticability in reaching its judgment."
Supreme Court cases add little to an accounting for impossibility; they serve only
to illustrate it." 5
Each of the leading Indian judgments dealing with impossibility
concluded that no excuse existed on the facts of each case.' 16 Yet, the reasoning
110. Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 110.
11l. Id. at 116 ("The doctrine of frustration of contract is really an aspect or part of the
law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality . . . and
does not leave the matter to be determined according to the intention of the parties.").
112. Id. (quoting Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd., [1944]
A.C. 265, 275 (H.L.)). Boothalinga Agencies may be the only Supreme Court judgment
reversing a High Court and concluding that performance was impossible. Lord Wright was
alone in his rejection of the construction of implied conditions in Denny, Mott, admitting
his view was "somewhat heretical." Id. at 276. Lords Thankerton and Porter both affirmed
their support for the classical justification for impracticability. Id. at 271, 281, 283.
113. Indus. Fin. Corp. v. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills, Ltd., A.I.R. 2002
S.C. 1841. Of the Court's numerous previous judgments in connection with Section 56, the
Industrial Finance Court cited only Naihati Jute. Id. Its failure to take into account the
1969 judgment in Boothalinga Agencies may explain its laconic reference to the classical
justification.
114. Id. (citing with approval language from NaihatiJute basing discharge on implied
terms).
115. See, e.g., M.D. Army Welfare Housing Org. v. Sumangal Servs. Private Ltd.,
A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1344 (holding that an obligor cannot avail itself of Section 56 if its
negligence caused supervening event); Anand v. Advent Corp., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 2290
(holding that only final governmental rejection of application for conveyance renders
contract to convey impossible); Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1756 (holding
that an agreement to lease land in Pakistan became impossible to perform due to communal
violence); Mohan Lal v. Grain Chambers Ltd., A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 772 (holding that the
imposition of a restraint on the transport of a good, unless required by the government, does
not amount to impossibility as contemplated by Section 56); Govindbhai Gordhanbhai
Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mulla Allibhai, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1019 (holding that a governmental
agency's rejection of initial application to convey property did not render contract to
convey impossible).
116. See, e.g., Naihati Jute Mills Ltd., v. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 522; Mugneeram
Bangur & Co., v. Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1523; Alopi Parshad & Sons, Ltd. v. Union of
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of the Supreme Court makes the work of lower courts more difficult. Had the
Court restrained itself from canvassing English jurisprudence, had it limited
impossibility to what would have been understood in 1872, had it refrained from
analyzing even its broadened understanding of impossibility as if it were looking
for an implied condition, and had it set forth a clear purpose and test for (in)justice
under Section 56, the consequentialist hope might have been realized. In short,
statutory realization of the precision corollary has failed to constrain judicial
discretion, at least in India; judicial glosses, historical asides, and contradictory
explanations have obscured the straightforward rule of Section 56.'

II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
American courts and legislatures have not advanced the goal of
efficiency in their consideration of impracticability."' The precision corollary has
not been employed, if only because efficiency has not been the only (or even the
principal) goal of lawmaking with regard to impracticability." 9 Just what is the
goal of impracticability law remains unclear. American law regarding excuse on
account of impossibility immediately before the enactment of the Indian Contract
Act was as narrow as any statement of English common law.' 20 As the nineteenth

India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 588; Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., A.I.R. 1954
S.C. 44.
117. See generally Aubrey L. Diamond, Codification of the Law of Contract, 31 MOD.
L. REV. 361, 377-78 (1968) (discussing failure of courts to apply Indian Contract Act as

written because "itis very difficult to prevent judges from applying the law they know, and
have learnt to love, instead of the new and strange statute").
118. See infra text accompanying notes 126-30.
119. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note
(1981) ("Even where the obligor has not limited his obligation by agreement, a court may
grant him relief . . . In such a case the court must determine whether justice requires a
departure from the general rule that the obligor bear the risk . . . ."). See also JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 146 (5th ed. 2000) ("More
commonly . .. the contingency will be one not foreseen by the parties and about which they
had no expectations. . . . Here the court is not called upon to interpret the contract; its job is
to direct a just and reasonable result.").
120. See, e.g., DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK §
777 (1865) ("Everything is deemed possible, except that which is impossible in the nature
of things."); id. at

§

727 ("The want of performance of an obligation ...

is excused ...

[w]hen it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible superhuman cause . . . unless the parties
have expressly agreed to the contrary . . . ."); 1 WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 463 (4th ed. 1856) ("And even if a man contract to do something,
which is at the time impossible in fact, but not impossible in its nature, he is liable in
damages for a breach of contract for non-performance."); id. at § 464 ("[H]ardship alone
cannot be regarded as a sufficient ground of relief, unless it amount to so great a degree of
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century progressed, some relaxation can be detected through increased use of
implied conditions.12' By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century,
Samuel Williston, the leading American treatise writer, acknowledged a much
wider scope of excuse,122 labeled it impracticability,123 and based its application on
a reasonable allocation of risk.124 The original Restatement of Contracts specified
the rule without clarifying its basis: "In the Restatement of this Subject
impossibility means not only strict impossibility but impracticality because of
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved." 25
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts squarely lays the foundation of
impracticability on justice: "the court must determine whether justice requires a
departure from the general rule that the obligor bear the risk that the contract may
become more burdensome or less desirable." 26 Yet, the contours of "justice" are
largely unspecified. While finding implied conditions was explicitly rejected as
the test of impracticability, the substitute of "basic assumptions" 27 is hardly
inconvenience and absurdity, as to afford judicial proof that such an agreement could not
have been intended by the parties.").
121. See, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 42 (2d ed.
1880)
[T]he law supposes that .. . the performance of a covenant or promise
to render personal service will be made impossible by the death of the
covenantor or promisor before performance, and may be made
impossible or impracticable by his illness. . . . [T]he hardship of

requiring a party to pay damages for non-performance is so great as to
raise a presumption that the event would have been made a condition
subsequent if it had been foreseen, and therefore the law will imply the
condition.
Id.
122. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1963 (1920) ("[W]here a very
great increase in expense is caused by a circumstance not only unanticipated but
inconsistent with facts which the parties obviously assumed as likely to continue, the basic
reason for excusing the promisor from liability seems present.").
123. Id. ("'[N]on-existence' really means in most cases, not obtainable except by
means and with an expense impracticable in a business sense and not contemplated by the
parties.").
124. Id. ("The important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance, the risk of
which should not fairly be thrown upon the promisor, has made performance of the promise
vitally different from what was reasonably to be expected."). Williston does not further
analyze fairness or what is reasonable.
125. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932).
If the drafters of the first
Restatement had the goal of efficiency in mind, they explicitly rejected the precision
corollary. Official Comment a notes that as used in the Restatement "'impossible' must be
given a practical rather than a scientifically exact meaning." Id. §454 cmt. a.
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note (1981).
127. See id. § 261.
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clearer or easier to apply.128 The Introduction to Chapter 11 of the Restatement
(Second) cites three factors for courts to consider when applying the "basic
assumptions" test, but provides no formula for weighing them.129 Regardless of
what the drafters believed about justice, they deliberately cast the rules of
impracticability at the level of principles.130 Neither efficiency nor precision are
served when the standard is a vague and contested principle.
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code is no more precise, and
neither it, nor the Official Comments, clearly account for providing an "excuse by
failure of presupposed conditions." 3 ' Foreseeability seems to be the key to

Where, after a contract has been made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
Id.
128. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 119, at 143:
The doctrines of Impossibility, Commercial Impracticability or as the
Uniform Commercial Code knows it, Excuse by Failure of Presupposed
Conditions, comprise unclimbed peaks of contract doctrine.... In spite
of attempts by all of the contract scholars and even in the face of
eloquent and persuasive general statements, it remains impossible to
predict with accuracy how the law will apply to a variety of relatively
common cases.
129. The first of the three factors-determining who assumed the risk-harkens back
to finding implied conditions. The third-the ability of the market to spread the risksounds in efficiency. Only the second factor-the relative bargaining position of the
parties-sounds in normative justice.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note ("This Chapter
is concerned with the principles that guide [the court's] determination.").
132. See John D. Wladis, Impracticabilityas Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligationsfor the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REv. 503, 530
(1988). Discussing comments by Karl Llewellyn, the principal draftsman for the Revised
Uniform Sales Act that became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Wladis notes,
The contract for sale, as envisaged by merchants, puts on the seller the
risk of rise in the market, and on the buyer the risk of fall in the market.
But that contract presupposes that general conditions of operation will
continue in such fashion as to make the contract performable by
reasonable business effort.
Id. Llewellyn believed that excuse on account of impracticability could simply be implied
as a matter of fact in every contract for the sale of goods. See generally id. at 568-69.
Thus, even though Llewellyn was a Realist, his justification of the excuse of
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applying UCC 2-615,132 which suggests that courts working with this section are
not employing the efficiency paradigm-at least not directly. "Foreseeability"
suggests a duty (presumably a moral one) that the courts believe an adversely
affected promisor owes its promisee."' Richard Posner, however, has suggested
that the duty encompassed within foreseeability is not fundamentally moral but is,
rather, a shorthand expression identifying situations in which the cost of acquiring
information about a particular risk is not so high as to have prevented the
breaching party from dealing with that risk in the contract. 3 4 By requiring courts
to calibrate the costs of identifying risks and the relative capacity to bear (or
insure against) them, Posner's version of the efficiency paradigm suggests a more
robust place for judicial deployment of impracticability than does Robert Scott's.
In other words, Posner has more faith in the courts' ex post ability to evaluate
efficiency than Scott.' 3 5

III. EFFICIENCY, PRECISION AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
James Gordley has suggested that the Western legal tradition-common
and civil law-has long suffered from a confusion of categories when it comes to
impracticability was very traditional in the classical late-nineteenth century sense; he
appealed neither to efficiency nor justice but to the parties' implicit understanding.
132. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 119, at 146-47.
133. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J.
LEG. ANALYSIS 207, 224-25 (2009) (discussing role of fault in changed-circumstances
cases).
134. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 203-04 (5th ed. 1998). In
other words, the contractual silence of a party whose costs of discovery and allocation of
risk are low signals a commitment to perform regardless of occurrence of the risk.
135. Of course, the issue of justifying efficiency as the source of extra-contractual
norms remains for both Posner and Scott. See C. Scott Pryor, PrincipledPluralism and
ContractRemedies, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 723, 729-32 (2009). For a contrasting view of
the capability of courts to recognize a sufficiently large change in the balance of incentives
see Craswell, supra note 3. However, Craswell ultimately goes on to conclude,
Once it is seen that there is more to efficiency than the efficiency of the
actual performance, however, the case for judicial second-guessing
becomes weaker.

. .

. [T]hough it is possible for these combined effects

[of choices of contract parties, not merely the choice to perform or
breach,] still to be positive on balance, that judgment is obviously more
complicated, and therefore harder for courts to get right.

. .

. [T]o the

extent that the attraction of judicial second-guessing depends on there
being clear or easy cases where enforcement would obviously be
inefficient, that attraction can no longer be claimed once the full range
of efficiency consequences is recognized.
Id. at 38-39.
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dealing with impossibility, impracticability, and frustration.136 An unfortunate
combination of historically disparate legal doctrines has perplexed courts and
scholars alike as they tried to develop a coherent rationale for these doctrines. "
Beginning in the first millennium, Roman law recognized a very limited excuse
for impossibility.3 3 Roman law excused performance of certain types of contracts
if performance was impossible when the contract was made; however, subsequent
events excused performance only if they were of the sort no one could have
prevented.' 39 For the Romans, impossibility was objective ("it cannot be done")
and not subjective ("I cannot do it"). In the first half of the second millennium,
Continental scholastic, late-scholastic, and natural lawyers already found it
difficult to provide a theory justifying what Roman law taught because they
analyzed the problem of excuse in terms of fault, a concept that Roman contract
law did not use.'40 The civil law tradition continues in this vein.' 4 ' The source of
confusion for lawyers in the common law tradition was different; they confounded
impossibility with the idea of implied conditions.'42 We see evidence of this
growing "confounding" in a comparison of impossibility, as described in Chitty,143
with that in Pollock only 23 years later.'" The 11 excuses noted in Chitty may
136. See JAMES GORDLEY,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT

FOUNDATIONS

OF PRIVATE

LAW:

PROPERTY,

TORT,

339 (2006) ("In England, Roman law was borrowed [by
nineteenth century jurists] in part but then confounded with another doctrine entirely, which
concerned implied conditions.").
137. Id. at 336-44.
138. Id. at 337 ("According to one text, if his performance was initially impossible, a
party cannot escape liability if performance is merely beyond his own power. It must be

beyond anyone's power.").
139. Id.
140. Id. at 339.
[T]here was a deeper reason why the natural law theory could not
explain the Roman texts. The natural lawyers had a theory about when
a person was at fault in the moral sense. As Zimmermann and
Wollschlager have pointed out, such a theory could not explain Roman
law because the Romans were really imposing liability absent fault for
risks that, in their view, should fall on the promisor.
Id.
141. See id. at 339-42.
142. Id. at 339.
143. Compare supra text accompanying notes 26-28 with supra text accompanying
note 53. Chitty lists 11 excuses of the duty to perform, supra note 26, at 640-47, but, even
as late as 1853, there was no unifying concept such as implied conditions for discovering
the "true intention" of the parties under which to group these disparate grounds of excuse.
Not until after Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 ENG. REP. 309 (Q.B.), was there a judicial
footing on which to build the "implied condition" structure for excuse on account of
impossibility.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 32-53.
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have been the result of judicial rules of construction, but only in Pollock do "rules
of construction" become the principle around which excuse of contractual
obligations by implication of conditions is organized. 145
Sections 32 and 56 of the Indian Contract Act presented an opportunity
to separate what had grown together. Section 56 could have been restricted to
impossibility as historically understood. The protean doctrine of changed
circumstances could have found a home in Section 32. The Indian Contract Act
provided a framework within which the confounding observed by Gordley could
have been limited if not reversed. Had the Indian courts confined Section 56 to its
1872 perimeter, impossibility as originally understood would have stood on its
own. 1" In turn, Section 32 would have provided the statutory basis to develop a
doctrine of implied terms to deal with an increasing range of subsequent events
that might be deemed to excuse performance. Not only has the failure of the
Indian courts to follow the narrow way missed an opportunity to further the goal
of efficiency, it has obscured the analysis of the grounds that should excuse

performance. 14 7
The Indian Supreme Court asserted in BoothalingaAgencies that there is
no basis in the parties' understanding or the circumstances of the contract from
which to derive an implied condition excusing performance:
Though it has been constantly said by high authority ... that the
explanation of the rule is to be found in the theory that it
depends on an implied condition of the contract, that is really no
explanation. It only pushes back the problem a single stage. It
leaves the question what is the reason for implying a term. Nor
can I reconcile that theory with the view that the result does not
depend on what the parties might or would as hard bargainers

145. See POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 335.
By the modem understanding of the law we are not bound to seek for a

general definition of 'the act of God' or vis major, but only to ascertain
what kind of event were within the contemplation of the parties ... . In
other words, we are thrown back upon the nature and construction of
the particular contract.
Id.
146. The Privy Council opened the door to interpretive freedom in constructing the
Indian Contract Act slightly in Ramdas v. Amerchand & Co., A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 7, where it
rejected the appellant's tendentious reading of the definition of documents of title. Even
here, however, the Privy Council limited the Act's meaning to its "reasonable
interpretation." Id. at 6.
147. See supra text accompanying notes I16-17.
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have agreed. The doctrine is invented by the court in order to
48
supplement the defects of the actual contract.1
A conclusion of impossibility must thus be a purely judicial act-an
implication to be sure but one from the court's evaluation and not the parties' tacit
understanding.149 However, a principled basis for that act has escaped detailed
judicial explication in India. From the American side, the leading academic basis
for concluding performance is impracticable has been efficiency-specifically, the
allocation of the risk that the occurrence of an unspecified event that would
substantially reallocate (or reduce) the expected contractual surplus.o50 Yet, other
efficiency-oriented scholars like Robert Scott are deeply skeptical of the ability of
the law to engage in such reallocation without increasing even greater
inefficiencies. '' In any event, a review of the Indian judgments on Section 56
reveals no effort to frame impossibility in terms of efficiency.
If not efficiency, then what?
IV. CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF JUSTICE IN
IMPRACTICABILITY
Law makers-legislative and judicial-routinely fail to implement the
America has experienced the progression from
efficiency goal: why?
impossibility to impracticability in the U.C.C.'52 The American common law of
contracts has paralleled the law of sales. 5 3 A small list of excusing events has
expanded, while the formerly precise rules governing excuse have morphed into
abstract principles. With the increased number and increasing vagueness of the
148. Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 110, 116
(quoting Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co., [1944] A.C. 265, 275
(H.L.)). A page later, however, the Court admits that Section 56 is a rule of positive law
and that English decisions "cannot therefore be of direct assistance" although they may
have "persuasive value." Id. at 117. The Court does not further elaborate how decisions
founded on a theory of implied conditions can be of persuasive value when applying a
statute of another jurisdiction.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
150. See Cenini, et al., supra note 109, at 3 ("Efficiency requires allocating the risk to
the parties who can bear it at least cost. In this way, the cost of remote risks would be
minimized while the contractual surplus would be maximized . . . ."); see also Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in ContractLaw: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
151. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial
Impracticability in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 63
(1991). For a criticism of structuring impracticability along risk allocation lines see
GORDLEY, supra note 136, at 345.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
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grounds of excuse, the role and responsibility of the judiciary has increased.15 4
International efforts to codify commercial law have proven to be equally
inhospitable to the arid precision of efficiency.'
A steadfast consequentialist might suggest rent-seeking motives for these
changes: courts might be trying to expand the scope of their activity by moving
from clarity to confusion, from precise to fuzzy rules. Legislatures dealing with
private law may have been captured by a law-making caste of academics whose
professional prestige would be undermined either by advocating adoption of hardedged rules or by failing to come to consensus on rigid rules, leading to soft-edged
standards as the price for consensus."s' Judges and law professors gain because
neither bears the increased costs of lack of precision; the externalities of
imprecision are shifted to private contract parties.'
Robert Scott argues that the
move of sophisticated contract parties from public to private forums for dispute
resolution is evidence for something like these conclusions."'
154. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30
CARDOZO L. REv. 2073 (2009) (citing superior adjudicative services and precise substantive
law as reasons for commercial parties' choice of New York courts as a forum for business
litigation); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards,2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986).
155. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods art. 79, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS
art.
7.1.7
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversionprincipl
es2004-e.pdf.
156. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995).
157. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 1, at 461-62.
[T]he structural characteristics of the private legislative groups charged
with formulation of sales law in the United States will result in the
promulgation of many vague standards that vest considerable discretion
in subsequent interpreters, such as judges, rather than specifying
precise entitlements that follow from described circumstances. In the
international context, the parallel argument suggests, treaties will use
vague terms or ambiguous language that nations with different cultures
and legal systems can interpret in an unobjectionable manner. Vague

language, for instance, may minimize objections because it permits
representatives from different legal systems to resolve uncertainties in a
manner consistent with their domestic legal principles.
Id.
158. See Scott, supra note 7, at 378 ("Unsurprisingly, therefore, the dominance of
standards over rules and context over text has coincided with a mass exodus from the

public enforcement regime by important classes of contracting parties."). While Scott does
not explicitly assert a causal nexus between a decrease in the precision of public standards
for private law and an increase in the use of arbitration, he clearly believes this is the case.
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Yet, such an explanation suggests a deep-rooted duplicity on the part of
law makers and undercuts claims to political legitimacy in a liberal polity.'59
Alternatively, something other than efficiency might be driving law makers to
reallocate the effects of unforeseen risks. Perhaps a normative concern,
inconsistent with efficiency, has led to recasting a strong and precise rule of
impossibility, bordering on absolute liability, as the standard of impracticability.
The occasional references of the Indian Supreme Court to justice in its analysis of
Section 56'6 suggest that something other than efficiency might be at work.
Reviews of other strands in the common law tradition suggest the same.' 6 1
Perhaps justice, understood normatively, but never articulated clearly, irresistibly
pulls most judges and legislators toward understanding impracticability in terms
other than efficiency.
Two American contracts scholars have attempted to bring a normative
perspective to account for the doctrine of impracticability. Melvin Eisenberg
suggests that notwithstanding the mantra of strict liability, morality-understood
by him in the use of fault in a variety of ways-is fundamental to contract law 62
and necessarily so.163 Efficiency is an insufficient leg on which to base contract

However, he cites little evidence for such a contention. Others have suggested the speed
and economy of arbitration as factors explaining its increased use. See, e.g., Giles
Cuniberti, Beyond Contract-The Case for Default Arbitration in International
Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 417 (2009) (arguing that arbitration of
international commercial disputes should be favored because it is fair, saves public
resources, and is flexible); POSNER, supra note 134, at 642 (framing choice of arbitration
over adjudication in terms of expertise and impartiality); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). But see Frank
Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 281 (2005) (challenging conventional
wisdom that arbitration is less costly than adjudication).
159. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification,48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1773, 1777 (2007) ("Any theory that falls short of identifying justifying reasons
that determine the outcomes of private law adjudication fails to justify the private law.").
160. See Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 44;

Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 110.
161. See, e.g., Luke Nottage, Changing ContractLenses: Unexpected Supervening Events
in English, New Zealand, U.S., Japanese, and International Sales Law and Practice, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385 (2007).
162. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law:
Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and
Nonperformance, 107 MIcH. L. REV. 1413 (2009) ("It is often asserted that contract law is

based on strict liability, not fault. This assertion is incorrect. Fault is a basic building
block of contract law, and pervades the field.") [hereinafter Eisenburg, Fault in Contract
Law]; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability,and Frustration, I
J. LEGAL ANALYsIs 207 (2009) (applying fault-based understanding to impracticability and
remedies).
163. Eisenberg, Fault in Contract Law, supra note 163, at 1414 ("As a normative
matter, fault should be a building block of contract law. One part of the human condition is
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law and must be "appropriately constrained" by moral conditions.'" Eisenberg
does not elaborate on the nature or basis of moral considerations; he takes them as
a necessarily human given.
James Gordley delves deeper and argues that fairness (understood as
maintaining equality of exchange) was, historically, the excuse of
impracticability's normative foundation. As Gordley, drawing on Aristotle and
others in that tradition, explains, it is evident that some manners of life are better
than others.' 6 5 Eudaimonia (happiness or flourishing) characterizes the good
life.' 6 6 While a person needs to know what morality requires and must also
possess some material goods to flourish, neither following duty nor satisfying
preferences is sufficient for the good life; an internal disposition toward the good
is also required.16 1 Instead, Gordley emphasizes the importance of the virtues of
prudence, temperance, and courage.16 8 In addition to these individual virtues, in
the Aristotelian tradition there are social virtues-the greatest of which is
justice. 169 The virtue of justice can be subdivided into distributive justice (that
which concerns the distribution of goods in a society) and commutative justice
(that which requires equivalence of exchange of resources).170 For purposes of

that we hold many moral values concerning right and wrong. Contract law cannot escape
this condition.").
164. Id.
165. GORDLEY, supra note 137, at 7 ("Writers in the Aristotelian tradition believed
there is a distinctively human life to which all one's capacities and abilities contribute.
Living such a life is the ultimate end to which all well-chosen actions are a means, either
instrumentally or as constituent parts of such a life.").
166. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 11-12 (David Ross trans., Oxford
World's Classics 1998).
[W]e call final without qualification that which is always desirable in
itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing
happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for
itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure,
reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves . . . but we

choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that through them
we shall be happy.
Id; see also GORDLEY, supra note 136, at 9 ("True welfare or happiness, in the Aristotelian

tradition, is not defined in terms of utility or preference satisfaction but in terms of leading
a good life.").
167. See generally NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2008).
168. GORDLEY, supra note 136, at 8; see ARISTOTLE, supra note 166, at 35-37
(defining moral virtues).
169. See James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in
NEw ESSAYS 265, 266-67 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).

THE THEORY

OF CONTRACT LAW:

170. See id. at 267 ("In voluntary transactions, when people exchange, commutative
justice requires that the resources exchanged be equivalent in value so that neither party's
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contracts, commutative justice requires that a contract party agree to give up
goods or services, but only for a price that enriches neither of the parties.'
Equality of exchange is the hallmark of voluntary commutative justice.172 Thus,
when an unexpected event occurs, it would be unfair to saddle the obligor with the
increased cost of performance if the contract price did not reflect the cost of
assuming that risk."'
The Indian Supreme Court, however, has not accounted for the place that
justice should occupy in the application of Section 56.174 Without such an
account, lower courts have no guidance except by example. The Court's example
is clear: no normative understanding of justice is significant when applying
Section 56. In the two cases in which the Court referred to "justice," the Court
arrived at its judgments by construing the contract or by applying the excuse of
illegality that Section 56 expressly provides."' In neither case was an appeal to
principle, apart from the language of Section 56, necessary; straightforward
statutory construction, without reference to theory, would have been sufficient.

V. CONCLUSION
The circle has been completed. This article began its analysis of Section
56 of the Indian Contract Act with the observation that its intendment limited the

share is diminished."); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 166, at 111 (distinguishing two
kinds of justice).
171. See GORDLEY, supra note 136, at 12.
172. See Gordley, supra note 169, at 267 ("In voluntary transactions, when people
exchange, commutative justice requires that the resources exchanged be equivalent in value
so that neither party's share [of wealth] is diminished.").
173. See GORDLEY, supra note 136, at 376.
[R]isks and burdens should be placed on the party who can bear them at
least cost. The price should then be adjusted to compensate him for
bearing them. . . . [T]he contract will be unfair if the party who can bear
the risk at least cost succeeds in shifting it to the other party since the
party shifting the risk would prefer to bear it himself if he had to
compensate the other party fairly.

. .

. In contrast, from an Aristotelian

standpoint, the rationale is fairness: to avoid, so far as feasible, changes
in the share of purchasing power that belongs to each party.
Id.
174. Nor have the English courts that have recently ventured to opine that justice plays
a role in impracticability explained what they mean by the term. See, e.g., Lauritzen A.S.
v. Wijsmuller B.V. (The Super Servant Two), [1990] 1 LLOYD'S REP. 1, 8 (C.A.); Nat'l
Carriers, Ltd. v. Panalpina, Ltd., [1981] A.C. 675, 696 (H.L. 1980).
175. See Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 44;
Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 110.
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excuse of impossibility to the narrow set of circumstances well-known in the
English common law in 1872. Review of the Indian Contract Act disclosed that
Sections 9 and 32 permit Indian courts to exercise the power of construction to
supplement an express agreement with an implied term excusing an obligor's duty
to perform. The Indian Supreme Court has moved beyond this statutory
framework and has expanded Section 56 in unpredictable and even, one might
say, unprincipled ways. Unprincipled, that is, because the Court has not disclosed
an understanding of the principle of justice that parties or lower courts can use to
predict or justify decisions. Unconstrained by statute, the American common law
has come to largely the same pass. Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code simply codifies the identical result.
Reviewing advocates of the consequentialist paradigm reveals
Richard Posner advocates allocating the risk of
inconsistent approaches.
unaddressed events in the most efficient way. Robert Scott argues that courts lack
the capacity to do so effectively. Advocates of a normative approach, such as
Melvin Eisenberg, give morality or justice priority over efficiency, but leave the
underpinnings of their approaches without foundation. James Gordley has
articulated a specific understanding of the normative value of fairness (equality in
exchange), but application of Aristotelian ethics to legal theory has not found
many followers.
One need not be committed to efficiency as the only goal of contract law
to believe that courts and contract parties generally would be better served by
applying the classical understanding of impracticability. Absent the efficiency
goal, the precision corollary retains value. For all their faults, Sections 9, 32, and
56 of the Indian Contract Act, as originally understood, were fully sufficient for
courts to deal with the problems created by unexpected subsequent events.
Limiting Section 56 to the types of impossibility known in the English common
law in 1872 and utilizing a nuanced Section 32 would have served the purposes of
the law. One can hardly doubt that the inefficiencies created by deploying and
then ignoring an undefined standard of justice exceed the vanishingly small value
that such a standard might provide in the extraordinary case where the classical
tools would not suffice.

